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Abstract 
- 
This paper deals with logic programs containing two kinds of negation: negation as failure 
and explicit negation. This allows two different forms of reasoning in the presence of incomplete 
information. Such programs have been introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz and called extended 
programs. We provide them with a logical semantics in the style of Kunen, based on Belnap’s 
four-valued logic, and an answer sets’ semantics that is shown to be equivalent to that of Gelfond 
and Lifschitz. 
The proofs rely on a translation into normal programs, and on a variant of Fitting’s extension 
of logic programming to bilattices. 
1. Introduction 
One of the striking features of logic programming is that it naturally supports noli- 
monotonic reasoning by means of negative literals. Simply inferring negative informa- 
tion from a positive program is already a form of nonmonotonic inference that shows 
essential differences between the two main approaches to the model-theoretic semantics 
of logic programs: namely the standard model approach and the program’s compktion 
approach. 
In the standard model approach, the semantics of a positive program is identified to 
the least Herbrand model of the program. Then TA must be inferred if A is false in the 
least Herbrand model of the program (i.e. closed world assumption). In the program’s 
completion approach, the clauses defining the same predicate are read as a definition 
of the predicate using an equivalence connective in place of implications. Then -,.4 
must be inferred if 1.4 is a logical consequence of the completion of the program. 
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From a programming language point of view, the standard model approach is not 
viable because it is untractable, namely the set of false atoms is not recursively enu- 
merable. From a knowledge representation point of view however, standard models 
correspond naturally to the intended semantics of programs. Therefore the challenge 
is to provide constructs that capture the essential aspects of standard models, in a 
recursively enumerable setting. 
In the framework of normal programs which allow negation inside program clause 
bodies, the stable models of [12] provide a general notion of standard model. Stable 
models however may not exist or may not be unique. Stratified and perfect models [3], 
are particular cases of stable models uniquely defined for restricted classes of normal 
programs. Three-valued standard models have also been defined to resolve the difficulty 
of existence and uniqueness of a standard model for normal programs. None of these 
notions of standard model for normal programs however is computable so any concrete 
operational semantics is necessarily incomplete. 
On the other hand, the completion of a normal program may be inconsistent, e.g. 
with P = {p :-lp}, P* = {p H -p}, in which case any literal should be inferred. In 
order to resolve these difficulties, Kunen proposed to take the set of the consequences 
in three-valued logic of the program’s completion as the declarative semantics of the 
program. In the previous example, taking the third truth value u for p provides a 
model of P’ as u tf 7~. Kunen proved a completeness result [18] for the negation 
as failure rule w.r.t. the three-valued completion of the program, followed by stronger 
completeness results for the constructive negation rule [19,7]. 
In this paper we study extended logic programs as introduced by Gelfond and Lif- 
schitz [ 13,141 (see also [21,1 J) to deal with two kinds of negation: explicit negation 
allowed in clause heads and bodies and negation by failure allowed in clause bodies 
only. These two negations allow two different forms of reasoning in the presence of in- 
complete information: to infer not A, you may want to know that A cannot be inferred 
(it is the case of negation by failure /A), or you may require an explicit inference 
process for not A, when e.g. the closed world assumption cannot be made on A (it is 
the case of explicit negation IA). 
We study the existence of four-valued Belnap’s models for extended programs and 
develop a nine-valued Kunen-style semantics for extended programs. Because the nega- 
tion as failure connective is not monotonic w.r.t. the knowledge ordering, our con- 
struction is not an instance of the bilattice extension of logic programming proposed 
by Fitting in [IO], it corresponds rather to an extension of this framework to in- 
corporate negation as failure: our 3 x3 construction extends Fitting’s programs on 
the 2 x2 bilattice of Belnap’s logic, in the same way as programs with negation 
as failure (provided with three-valued semantics) extend positive (two-valued) pro- 
grams. 
Furthermore we show that the answer sets of [14] correspond to a notion of stan- 
dard 4-valued Belnap’s models, and we suggest with examples that our computable 
semantics captures essential aspects of the answer set semantics for extended 
programs. 
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2. Preliminaries on extended logic programs 
2.1. Closed lvorld assumption 
When the closed world assumption is not applicable, i.e. when dealing with possibly 
incomplete or inconsistent information, the deduction process of the falsity of a sentence 
A should be independent from that of the truth of A. Such a deduction process should 
then be able to infer negative information in another way than does the usual negation 
as failure, namely it should be able to infer “explicitly” negated information as well as 
positive one. In order to do this, one has to distinguish between two kinds of negation: 
explicit negation (denoted -) and negation as failure (denoted I). Not unexpectedly, 
7 will be allowed to occur in the head of clauses, but not I. 
Here is a short example borrowed from [14]. A College uses the following rules for 
awarding scholarships to its students: 
(i) Every student with a GPA of at least 3.8 is eligible. 
(ii) Every minority student with a GPA of at least 3.6 is eligible. 
(iii) No student with the GPA under 3.6 is eligible. 
(iv) The students whose eligibility is not determined by these rules are interviewed by 
the scholarship committee. 
Assume this program is used in conjunction with a database containing the following 
fact about one of the students: Ann’s GPA is 3.7. The database contains no information 
about minority(ann), whereas Ann is a minority student, but declined to state this fact 
on her application, as a matter of principle. Representing such a knowledge in a logic 
programming language requires thus two kinds of negation: an explicit negation, which 
may occur in the head of clauses (rule 3) and negation by failure (rule 4). 
Such programs have been introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz in [13] and called 
extended programs. 
Note that the two kinds of negation allow to distinguish between temporary and 
clrlfinitiue lack of information. For this reason, extended programs have been early 
devoted to temporal reasoning about actions. In [ 151 Gelfond and Lifschitz use them 
as a language for deriving properties of actions in an open context. 
2.2. Syntax of extended programs 
We assume our language 9 to be fixed, and contain, for each n 3 0, a countable set 
of n-ary function symbols and a countable set of n-ary predicate symbols; in addition, 
2’ has a symbol = for equality, that never occurs in a program, but is used in forming 
the completed program. The set V of variables is fixed as well. 
Atomicjtirmulas are defined as usual from 2 and V.. A classical literal is an atomic 
formula or the explicit negation 1A of an atomic formula A. A (general) literal is a 
classical literal or the negation by failure, IL, of a classical literal L. A literal of the 
form IL is called a slashed literal. A clause is of the form: 
Lo :-L1,...,L,,IL,+I,...,IL,, 
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where the Li’s are classical literals, 0 <m <n, and commas stand as usual for con- 
junctions A. If II = 0, we just write Lo. Lo is called the head of the clause, and 
(Ll,...,LM,lL,+l,..., /Ln) its body. Note that a clause admits explicitly negated liter- 
als in its head. An (extended) program is a finite set of clauses. A query is of the 
form L1,...,L,,IL,+I,...,IL,. 
2.3. Call-consistent, stratified, p.o. c. and strict extended programs 
The following definitions are not essential for our semantics, they will be used in 
Section 5 to establish connections with the answer sets’ semantics of Gelfond and 
Lifschitz. 
Let PRED be the set of all predicate symbols or l-negated predicate symbols. Let P 
be a given program. If p, q E PRED, we define (as in [18]) p 7+1 q iff P contains a 
clause in which p occurs in the head and q occurs in a classical (not-slashed) literal of 
the body. We say p 2-1 q iff P contains a clause in which p occurs in the head and q 
occurs in a slashed literal of the body. Let 2 +i and 2 _ 1 be the least pair of relations 
on PRED satisfying: p>+lp and p 7, q & q 2jr + p >,.jr, i, j E {+1,-l}. 
Intuitively 3 +i (resp. 2 -1) denotes the relation of dependance among predicates 
through an even number (including 0) of / (resp. an odd number of /). 
These relations could have been defined similarly on ground atoms instead of pred- 
icates. In the following definitions, we use both forms (on predicates, on atoms), so 
for sake of clarity we explicitly mention which one is intended. 
We say that P is call-consistent iff we never have p 3 -1 p for any predicate symbol 
p, i.e. no predicate symbol or l-negated predicate symbol p is defined negatively from 
itself. 
Following [3] we say that an extended program P is stratzfied iff no predicate symbol 
or l-negated predicate symbol depends on itself through at least one / negation. 
It is locally stratified iff no ground atom or ground l-negated atom depends on 
itself through at least one / negation. 
Following [6] we say that an extended program P is positive order consistent (p.0.c.) 
iff the relation J+] on atoms has no infinite decreasing chain (it is in particular the 
case if all recursions are through one or more i). 
If 4 is a query, we say 4 >ip iff either a&p for some atom a occurring positively 
in 4 or a&p for some a occurring negatively in 4. An extended program P is said 
strict W.I. t. the query 4 iff for no predicate letter p do we have both 4>+1p and 
43-IP. 
3. Belnap’s logic 
In [4] Belnap introduced a four-valued logic intended to deal in a useful way with 
inconsistent or incomplete information (see also [2]). 
P. Ruet. F. FageslTheoretical Computer Sclence 171 119Y7) 61-75 65 
Fig. 1. The bllattice of Belnap’s logic 
A way to interpret Belnap’s truth values is to think of them as sets of classical truth 
values: we write t for {true}, f for {f&e}, I for 8 (indicating a lack of information) 
and T for {true, @/se} (indicating inconsistency). 
This set Y of truth values has two natural orderings: one is the subset relation, a 
knowledge ordering ak (the vertical ordering in Fig. I), and a truth ordering a, (the 
horizontal one). In this way, inconsistency (T) and lack of information (1) cannot 
be distinguished according to the truth ordering. Each of these orderings provides the 
set of truth values with the structure of a lattice, so that the whole structure can be 
considered as the simplest nontrivial hilattice [ 16,9]. 
Meet and join under at are denoted A and V; they are generalizations of the usual 
conjunction and disjunction. Meet and join under ak are denoted @ and 3, respec- 
tively, consensus and gullability operators; but we shall not need them in our ex- 
tended logic programs. On the other hand, there is a natural notion of negation 1, 
which Rips the diagram from left to right, switching J‘ and t, leaving I and T 
alone. 
In [lo] Fitting proposes an extension of logic programming to bilattices: to execute 
a bilattice logic program, you just compute the actual (truth) value v of the body of 
a clause and replace the value of the head by C. Since all connectives considered by 
Fitting are monotone w.r.t. ak, this mechanism amounts to adding information to the 
fact base: your knowledge about the situation increases (but not necessarily following 
the truth ordering). 
In this paper, we shall consider also connectives that are nonmonotonic w.r.t. the 
knowledge ordering in order to model negation as failure. We shall consider the 
slush i, which flips the diagram from bottom-left to top-right, switching f and T, 
and t and I 2 In a four-valued logic it is very natural to introduce such a con- 
nective, moreover there is a need for it, to get a fully expressive set of connec- 
tives: 
2 We will give some intuition behind the choice of / as the right connective for modelmg negation as failure 
in Section 4. 
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3.1. Complete sets of connectives 
In classical logic, the connectives 1, A and V form a complete set, i.e for every inte- 
ger n, all the mappings from {f, t}” to {f, t} can be expressed by composition of some 
of the connectives. In fact, 1 and A suffice to form a complete set for classical logic. 
When moving to Belnap’s logic, the connectives 1 and A extending the correspond- 
ing classical ones do not form a complete set. Precisely: if K, are sets of mappings 
from {f,t,l, T}” to {f, t, I, T}, and K = UKn, let us call E the intersection of all 
the sets S such that 
(i) S contains K, the 0-ary f, t, I, T, and the kth n-ary projection zt for every 
integers n 3 k 2 1, 
(ii) if f 1 . . . fp are in S and all n-ary, and if rc is in K and p-ary, then 
K o (fl . . . fp) is in S and is n-ary. 
We say that the set K is complete for F if K contains all the mappings from 
{f, t, I, T}” to {f, t, I, T}, for every integer n. 
Proposition 1. The connectives 7 and A do not form a complete set for Jo. 
Proof. Let K be this set of connectives. One verifies easily that 1 and A are monotone 
w.r.t. +, i.e. x$X’ implies +)ak+‘), and XakX’ and yaky’ imply x A yak_%? A y’. 
(The property that the lub and glb under one ordering of a bilattice are monotone 
in the other ordering holds in any distributive bilattice [16,11]; this is a corollary of 
Ginsberg’s representation theorem for distributive bilattices [ 161.) 
By induction, all connectives in z are monotone w.r.t. ak as well. But / is not 
monotone w.r.t. the knowledge ordering: for instance, lak t, but /I = t dk/t = -L. 
Hence / GE. 0 
Hence, to get a complete set of connectives, we need to add at least a non-monotonic 
connective to (1, A}. The addition of I suffices: 
Proposition 2. The connectives 1, A and /form a complete set for F. 
Proof. Let K’ be this set of connectives. We prove, by induction on n, that every 
function from {f, t, I, T}” to {f, t, -L, T} is in F. 
l n = 0 : Because of condition (i), all truth values are in F. 
l n + 1 : Define \x = ~/lx (exchanges f and I, t and T), and -x = /T/X. Hence 
the connectives \ and - belong to F. 
Now let f be a (n + 1)-ary function. We define the n-ary functions g, h, k, 1 by 
f(X1 . ..Xn.f) = g(x1 . ..x.) 
f-(x1 . . .Xn, t) = h(xl . .x~) 
f(x1 . ..x.,I) = k(x, . ..x.) 
.f(Xl . ..x.,T) = Z(x, . ..xn) 
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If (?t) is the unary function that lets t invariant and maps the other truth values 
tof, then we have f(xr . . .x,+1) = [(?t)( ‘&+i)Ag(x1 . ..Xn)lV[(?t)Xn+lAh(xl . ..x.)lV 
[(?tWn+l) A &I ” .&)I v [(?t>(\xn+, ) A 4x1 . . .&)I. 
But (?t)x = x A -x. Hence f can be expressed in K’, and the result is proved for 
any integer n. EI 
4. Nine-valued Kunen-style semantics via Belnap’s logic 
In the usual case (programs without explicit negation -), the semantics is three- 
valued, and this corresponds to the three possible situations for a ground query: ‘yes’ 
answer (true), finite failure (false) and looping (undefined). 
In the case of programs with both negations, the answers concerning the truth and 
falsity of a query are completely independant. So the truth value assigned to a formula 
A will be a couple of classical truth values (true, false, undefined), the 1st element 
of this couple corresponding to the knowledge about the truth of A, and the 2nd one 
corresponding to the knowledge about its falsity. Hence logic programs with both 
negations will be provided with a 9-valued Kunen-style semantics. 
Truth values are then handled as points in a square (see Fig. 2). For instance, 
t = (l,O), I = (0,O). . . We can define two projections on truth values: rcr (x, v) = .K 
and nz(x,y) = y, where x,y t {O,U, 1). Now define an order ct on {O,u, 1) by 
0 <l u <, 1, and the order-reversing function L‘ H r! by 0 = 1, 7 = 0 and U = II: 
then we may extend the connectives defined in Section 3 by (cl, ~‘2) A (~1, ~‘2 ) = 
(min<,(cl,~l),maxI,(u2,w2)), (cI,u~) V (147,~) = (max,,(vl,wl),min,,(U2.~~~2)), 
-(tll,l;2) = (c2,2;1) and /(zjt,u~) = (zjl,~). 
The choice of the connective / for modeling negation as failure becomes clear 
now. Since the positive and negative informations about a formula A are separated in 
Fig. 2. The 9-valued logic of extended programs 
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extended programs, such a connective has to negate (the truth value representing) the 
positive information in A, keeping unchanged the negative information in A. This is 
indeed what the connective I does. 
The definition of the completed program (see below) uses a (two-valued) Lukasiew- 
icz equivalence ++: u ++ w is t iff nl(v) = rci(w) and f otherwise. Note that c-f is 
not monotone w.r.t. the knowledge ordering of Belnap’s logic, just like /. Of course 
v H w can be defined here in terms of A, I and 1, thanks to Proposition 2. 
4.1. Completed program and nine-valued models 
4.1.1. Completed program 
Let L(zl, . . , 7,) :- 4 be a clause, with variables Yi . . . Yj. Its normalization is 
where Xl . . .X, are new variables. 
Let P be an extended program and L(X, ,...,Xn):-$i (l<i<m) be the m normal- 
izations of the clauses in P where L occurs in the head. Then the completed dejnition 
of the n-ary classical literal L is VXi . . VXn (L(X,, . . .,X,,) +-+ $1 V. . . V I+!I~). If m = 0, 
we just write /L(X,, . ,X,). 
Now the completed program P’ is the set of the completed definitions of all clas- 
sical literals, together with the axioms of Clark’s equational theory CET (see [5]). 
4.1.2. Nine-valued structures 
A nine-valued structure d for the fixed language 3 consists of a nonempty set A 
(the domain of interpretation), and 
(i) for every n-ary function symbol f, d(f) : A” -+ A is a n-ary function, 
(ii) for every n-ary predicate symbol p other than =, d(p) is a mapping from A” 
to the set of 9 truth values; &(=) is always true identity, i.e., d(=)(a,b) is t iff a 
and b are the same object and f otherwise. 
A four-valued structure is simply a nine-valued structure in which, for every predi- 
cate p, neither nl(d(p)) nor Q(sZ(P)) takes the value u. As usual, the interpretation 
is extended to formulas according to the nine-valued truth tables (defined above com- 
ponentwise); for the quantifiers, we define obviously &(3X$) = VaEA &(&a)) and 
d(vXti) = AUEA &(&a)). 
We say that the nine-valued structure ._& is a model of the completed program P’, 
denoted d ks P*, iff all formulas in P* have truth value t in &. If JJ is in fact a 
four-valued structure, then we write JZZ b4 P*. 
4.1.3. Extensions 
Let <k be the ordering on (0, u, 1) such that u <k 0 and u <k 1. If & and 
S3 are two nine-valued structures, we shall say that .?8 is an extension of & iff ~2 
and S? have the same domain of interpretation and agree on the interpretations of all 
P. Rurt. F. Fagesl Theoretical Computer Scirnce 171 11997) 61-75 69 
function symbols, and for each ground atomic formula 4, r~t(~~(~#~))<knl(:%I(#)) and 
7c2(.sJ($)) <kzz(a(4)). The natural ordering between extensions is induced by the 
ordering & defined component-wise on the 9 truth values from 6 k (see Fig. 3). 
Intuitively, an extension of JZZ is “less undefined” than .&. It is a concept different 
from that of “expansion” (see [IS]) and more natural in our context, but Kunen’s 
proofs of interest for us can be easily adapted to the notion of extension. 
To see this, let us return temporarily to the classical setting and recall the definition 
of an expansion: if .Y and 2 are sets of predicate symbols, ;/pi 2, it is a three- 
valued ./P-structure (i.e. a structure that interprets only predicate symbols in Y) and 
1 a three-valued 2-structure, then i I” is called an expansion of .&’ if .“I and I 
have the same domain and agree on the interpretations of all function symbols and 
predicate symbols in Y. Let us define an extension of a classical three-valued structure 
.J to be a three-valued structure .,1’ such that for every formula (b, I d!( 4) <k, 1 ‘( cb ). 
If .‘?p is a set of predicate symbols and .&’ is a three-valued Y-structure, let &’ + 
denote the structure such that A’~(p) = A’(p) if p E .P else I K,p( p) = u. Then 
the following (trivial) proposition establishes the connection between expansions and 
extensions. 
Proposition 3. Let .A%’ be a three-valued Y-structure und ..V‘ u three-valued .%struc- 
ture, ,t,ith 3’~ 1. _ti‘d is an extension qf ~2’~ ifs. 1” is an expansion qf M. 
This shows that expansions and extensions are about the same notion (for instance: 
Kunen’s immediate consequence operator y/ maps each three-valued structure to an 
“extension” of it; besides if .A! is a three-valued 2?-structure and S a signing for 
./PC 4. then 2val(A?,S)d is an “extension” of .Md; etc.). 
Fig. 3. The Y-valued bilattice based on Belnap’s logic 
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4.1.4. Immediate consequence operator 
Given an extended program P, we define an operator Tp which maps each nine- 
valued structure to an extension of it. Let & beasd a nine-valued structure, p a n-ary 
predicate and al . . . a,, E A. The domain of Tp(&) equals that of d; Tp(&) and JZZ 
agree on the interpretations of all function symbols. For predicate symbols, let u = 
Tp(&)(p)(al . . a,) be defined by 
(i) - rri(u) = 1 iff there is a clause in P of the form p(zl . .z,) :- 4, with variables 
Yi . . .q, and some br . . bj E A, such that nl(zZ(4)(bl . . . bj)) = 1 and Vi, 
&(zi)(bl . . . b,) = ai; 
- xl(u) = 0 iff for each clause in P of the form p(zl . . . z,) :- 4, with variables 
Yr . . . Yj and every bl . . bj E A, we have either zl(d(4)(bl . . . bj)) = 0 or some 
&(zi)(bl . . . bj) # ai; 
_ XI(U) = u otherwise. 
(ii) - Q(U) = 1 iff there is a clause in P of the form ~p(zl . . z,) :- 4, with variables 
Yi . . Yj, and some bl . bj E A, such that 7~1(&(4)(bl . . . bj)) = 1 and Vi, 
&(zi)(bl . . . bj) = a;; 
- Q(U) = 0 iff for each clause in P of the form ~p(zl . . .z,) :- q5, with variables 
Yr . . . Yj and every bl . . . bj E A, we have either zl(d($)(bl . . . bj)) = 0 or some 
&(zi)(bl . . . bj) # ai; 
_ n*(u) = u otherwise. 
One verifies easily that Tp(&‘) is indeed an extension of A@‘. 
Theorem 4. Let d be a nine-valued structure. TV = ZZ.! zff ~2 kg P*: the fixed 
points of Tp are exactly the nine-valued models of P*. 
4.1.5. Conversion to four-valued structures 
Since Tp is monotone (w.r.t. the well-founded ordering -& induced on nine-valued 
structures), it has a fixed point (see [S]), hence P* always has a nine-valued model. 
More specifically, as in the classical case, we would like to know when P* has in fact 
a four-valued model. This is given by the condition of call-consistency introduced in 
Section 2: 
Theorem 5. If P is call-consistent and d b9 P*, then & has a four-valued extension 
93 such that B kb Pt. As a consequence, zfP is call-consistent, then P* has a four- 
valued model. 
Theorem 6. Suppose P is call-consistent and strict w.r. t. a query 4. Then 4 is a 
four-valued consequence of P” ifs it is a nine-valued consequence of P*. 
This means that our extended programs are to Fitting’s programs on Belnap’s logic, 
what programs with negation as failure are to positive programs. 
In the next Section, we give proofs of these theorems through a “faithful” translation 
from extended programs to normal programs (such a translation has already been used 
by Gelfond and Lifschitz in [14]). 
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4.2. Reduction to normal programs 
Let 9 be a fixed first-order language. We build a new first-order language Y’ by 
adding to 9, for each predicate symbol p, a new predicate symbol p’. 
Let L be a classical literal built on the language 2’: if L is an atomic formula, then 
let L’ be L; if L = lp(al . . .a,,), then L’ = p’(al a,,). (Note that in any case, L’ 
is an atomic formula built on Y7.) 
Let P be an extended program. P’ is the classical program obtained by replacing 
each clause Lo :- LI,. ..,L,,l L,+, ,..., jLn by L,’ 1-L; ,..., L,‘, IL;,, ,..., IL;. In 
P’, i stands for negation as failure. Again, the notation / is unusual, but using 7 could 
have lent to confusion. Similarly we can define C’ for any set C of 6P-formulas such 
that negation 1 occurs only in front of atomic formulas. 
Let .d be a nine-valued (9-)structure. The three-valued (YP’-)structure .d‘ is de- 
fined as follows: 
(i) the domain of .d’ is A, the domain of d; 
(ii) for every n-ary function symbol f, zZ’(f) = .&(J’); 
(iii) for n-ary predicate symbols other than =, we have to distinguish between two 
cases: .d’(p) = z~(&(p)) and dy(p’) = nz(&(p)); .K(=) is always true (two- 
valued) identity, i.e. &‘(=)(a,b) is 1 iff a and b are the same object and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, if ll is a normal program, Yn denotes the immediate consequence operator 
of Kunen [ 181 on three-valued structures, and II* denotes Clark’s completed program 
1% 
Proposition 7. Let ,cP and g be nine-valued (_Y-) structures and P an extended 
program. The following statements hold. 
(i) G? is four-valued tr &‘y is two-valued, 
(ii) !% is an extension of d ifs B” is an extension of .d’; 
(iii) P*- = P’*; 
Proof. (i) and (iii) are clear. 
(ii) The main observation is that A, 1 and I are monotone w.r.t. the ordering ik, 
and that A and 7 are monotone w.r.t. <k. Now 95’ is an extension of d U for ev- 
ery ground formula 4, ~t(&(4))<krr~l(g(4)) and rc~(d($))Gk ~2(39(4))+=+for 
every n-ary predicate symbol p and each al . . .a, E A = B, W(d(P(al . ..a.))) 
dk71l(:%(p(al . ..a.))) and x~(&‘(~(uI . . . a,)))dkq(.B(p(al . ..a.))) (for A. 7 and i 
are monotone w.r.t. ik) M for every n-ary predicate symbol p and each UI u, t 
A=B, ~J’(p(a, . ..a.))dkW(p(al . ..a.)) andd’(p’(al . ..a.))dk38~(p’(q . ..a.)) 
+=+ for every ground formula (b, &P($) <k g7($) (for A and 7 are monotone w.r.t. 
<k) @ .%“ is an extension of d’; 
(iv) Follows from the definition of Tp and the remark that 
~2(T~(d’)(p)(a1 . .a,)> = ~I(TP(N(~P)(~I . .a,)). 
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(v) One can prove easily by induction that for every ground formula 4 such that 1 
occurs only in front of atomic formulas, we have &“($‘) = rci(d(4)). Now, for any 
completed definition \Jx . . . b’&(p(X~, . . . ,X,,) ++ $ in P*, we have & t=g p c-) $ w 
x1(&‘(p)) = nl(d(lC/)) w d’(p) = d’(t+h’) (thanks to the above remark) M 
dc4’ +=3 p c--) tj’. For any completed definition VXi .. ‘d&(~p(Xl,.. .,X,) ++ $ in 
P*, we have: d by up +-+ $ * W(4~P)) = nI(4+>> * JqP’) = Jq$‘) 
(thanks to the above remark) _ &T ks p’ H $‘. 0 
Proof of Theorem 4. It follows from Proposition 7(iii)-(v) and [18, Lemma 3.11. 
q 
Proof of Theorem 5. It is an easy consequence of Proposition 7(i), (ii) and (v) and 
[ 181 (Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.5: namely if ZI is a call-consistent normal program 
and A is a three-valued structure such that J? /=s Ii’*, then A has a two-valued 
extension JV such that JV” +g n*). 0 
Proof of Theorem 6. It follows directly from Proposition 7(i), (iii) and (v) and [ 181 
(Theorem 3.6): P* t-9 C$ iff P*- /-3 4’ by Proposition 7(v), iff P’* k3 4’ by 
Proposition 7(iii). Besides P’ is call-consistent and strict w.r.t. 4’ in the sense of 
Kunen, so by Theorem 3.6 [18], P’* F.3 4’ iff P’* 12 4’ iff P*- t2 $‘, i.e. for 
all two-valued @, g +z P*l implies SS +=2 4’, i.e. (by Proposition 7(i)) for all four- 
valued d, dce k2 P*7 implies d’ /=2 4’. By Proposition 7(v) this is equivalent to 
P* t-4 q5. q 
4.2. I. Operational semantics 
The reduction to normal programs allows to consider that literals A and 1A have 
a “separate life”. Hence SLDNF resolution [ 181 (resp. constructive negation [19,7]) 
provide extended programs with correct (resp. complete) operational semantics, in the 
following way: the answer to a given goal G in an extended logic program is obtained 
by combining the answers to G and G’ (in the corresponding normal program); each 
answer sets the value of one component UI or v2 of the truth value (v~,vz) of G: ‘yes’ 
is 1, ‘no’ is 0, no answer means U. 
Example. The rules in the example of Section 2 can be encoded in the following 
extended program P: 
eligible(X) :- highGPA(X). 
eligible(X) :- minority(X), fairGPA(X). 
1 eligible(X) :- 1 fairGPA(X). 
interview(X) :- / eligible(X), / 1 eligible(X). 
with the following facts: 
fairGPA(ann). 
1 highGPA(ann). 
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Our Kunen-style semantics (weaker than the answer sets’ semantics) suffices to de- 
duce the expected assertion interuiew(ann), i.e. interview(ann) is a nine-valued con- 
sequence of the completed program. Note that by Theorem 6, the four-valued conse- 
quences and nine-valued consequences of P* are identical, since P is call-consistent 
and strict w.r.t. inteuview(ann). 
5. Connection with the answer sets’ semantics 
In this section we define answer sets for our extended programs, which are obtained 
from those of Gelfond and Lifschitz’s by dropping their rule which globalizes contra- 
dictions (saying that a program which implies both A and 1A implies anything). We 
prove that our answer sets for a given program P are four-valued models of P*, if 
explicit negation and negation as failure are interpreted by the connectives 7 and i, 
respectively, i.e. that the logic underlying logic programming with classical negation 
and negation as failure is indeed Belnap’s logic. 
Let P be a program with no negation by failure: define p(P) as the least set S of 
ground classical literals such that for every ground rule instance L : - L,. . , L, in 
P, L I,.... L, ES --r. L E s. 
Let P be an extended program (with negation by failure) and S a set of ground 
classical literals: define Ps as the program (with no negation by failure) obtained from 
P by 
~~ removing every ground rule instance L :-L,, . . , L,, IL,,,+, , IL,, such that for some 
i, nz + 1 bi<n, Lj E S; 
_ removing all slashed literals from all other ground rules instances. 
Now define an answer set of an extended program P to be a solution S to the 
equation S = &Ps). 
Finally we define a translation m between sets of ground classical literals and four- 
valued structures: if S is a set of ground classical literals, m(S) is the structure whose 
domain is the Herbrand universe, that interprets terms by themselves and such that, if 
A is any ground atomic formula: 
~ if A E S, then nl(m(S)(A)) = 1, 
- if -A E S, then ~~(rn(s)(A)) = 1, 
~ if A @ S, then 7r,(m(S)(A)) = 0, 
~ if 1A 4 S, then TC~(~(S)(A)) = 0. 
Theorem 8. If S is an answer set of an extended program P, then m(S) is u fbur- 
wlued Herhrclnd model of P*. 
Proof. Let S be an answer set of P, i.e. S = p(Ps), al . . . a, be Herbrand terms, and 
VX, ,..‘Jx, (L(X I)...) X,) H $ be any completed definition in P*. We have to prove 
that n~(m(S)($)) = ~I(~(S)(L)(QI,...,Q,)). 
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- If 7Q(rn(S)(L)(Ui,. ,a,)) = 1 then L(ar,. ,a,) E S; because of the definition of 
p, there must be a ground rule instance RS : L(al,. . . ,a,) :- LI,. . . ,Lk in Ps such 
that L 1,. . . ,Lk E s. This rule comes from a rule R = (L :- L1,. . ,Lk,/Lk+l,. . . /L,) 
in P, and therefore &+I,. . . , L, $! s. Thus q(m(S)(& )) = . . . = n,(&!?)(Lk)) = 
nl(m(S)(/Lk+l)) = . . = 7C,(TYZ(S)(/L,)) = 1, and $ = 4 v ~(LI A . . fi Lk A /-&+I A 
. ..A/L.,). Hence nr(m(S)($)) = 1. 
- If 7cI(m(S)(L)(ul,. ..,a,)) = 0 then L(~I ,..., a,) q! S; for all ground rule instance RS 
in Ps of the form (L(al,...,u,):-LI , . . . ,Lk), one of the Lr , ,Lk does not belong 
to S, say Li, so that zl(m(S)(L~)) = 0 and hence xt(m(S)($)) = 0. 
- Xl (nW(L)(u1,. . ., a,)) = u never happens. 0 
Thus our answer sets can be identified with models in Belnap’s logic. Besides the 
well-known results about answer sets’ semantics for normal programs extend easily to 
our setting; we just sketch three theorems (for the definitions see Section 2): 
Theorem 9 (Fages [6]). If P is a cull-consistent extended program, then P has an 
answer set. 
Theorem 10 (Gelfond and Lifschitz [12]). If P is a locally stratzjied extended pro- 
gram, then P has exactly one unswer set. 
Theorem 11 (Fages [6]). If P is a p.o.c. extended program, then the answer sets of 
P coincide with the 4-valued Herbrand models of P*. 
6. Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is twofold: 
(i) From the viewpoint of Fitting’s programs on bilattices, we extend the programs 
on (the bilattice of) Belnap’s logic by the addition of a non-monotonic operator 
I, and we show that this notion of extended programs corresponds to the one of 
Gelfond and Lifschitz. 
(ii) From the viewpoint of the extended programs of Gelfond and Lifschitz, we pro- 
vide them with a logical semantics in the style of Kunen, and we show that the 
underlying logic is precisely Belnap’s logic. 
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